Appreciation is extended to the following individuals for their role in contributing to the development of this handbook.  Your thoughtful comments and suggestions reflect the goal of what this handbook is intended to achieve.
 
 

A special thanks to HEALNet Regional Health Planning for use of unpublished materials, and Tanya Dunn Pierce for the literature research.

Boards of education strive for effective educational governance. Changes in organizational philosophy and the context in which schools operate compel boards of education to reflect on how governance might be improved.  The 1996 SSTA Convention called upon the Association to develop a resource to familiarize trustees with new models of policy governance.

This resource provides information for trustees about different views and components of governance. It does not advocate for one point of view over another, but presents alternative strategies with the intention of informing the choices trustees have.

The topic of governance will likely evoke many contemporary issues for trustees: amalgamation; district size; jurisdictional issues; urban-rural differences; relationships with First Nations, school effectiveness, accountability; and many others. Rather than focusing on specific issues, however, this resource discusses board governance in general — how boards can organize themselves to make effective use of their authority within the current framework of The Education Act, 1995.

We provide excerpts from and make reference to contemporary analysts of governance and board development. We also touch on questions that have been raised by board members and trustees. There are eight headings for the discussion:

1. The Governing Board
2. Governing through Policies
3. Board and Program
4. Board Information Needs
5. Making Decisions
6. Board and Management
7. Accountability and Representation
8. Board Development

What is a governing board?

As trustees are aware, school boards in Saskatchewan derive their authority from the provincial government. School division boards are governing boards — that is, they have the highest authority for the division — as compared to advisory boards. The school board itself is a corporation, an entity composed of members, who are elected by and accountable to their electors as well as to the “Crown.” Accountability is the obligation to render an account for a responsibility conferred

It is important to recognize that not all governing boards are the same. They can be distinguished by the kind of organization they represent.

• in for-profit organizations and corporations, boards are appointed or elected from shareholders;
• in non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), boards are either appointed or elected from a membership; and
• in public sector organizations, including school systems, health districts or municipal councils, the boards or councils are elected from the population at large, and have a legislated mandate.

Many of the existing models for board governance are based on for-profit organizations, or NGOs. Few explicitly address the specific situation of boards such as school boards who have a dual accountability — there is both a legal mandate from the Crown and an accountability to the electorate. Questions about democratic representation, such as who does the board represent? are an important component of addressing governance.

What is governance?

Governance consists of decisions and actions linked to
 

• defining an organization’s mission; and to
• establishing its polices and control mechanisms to:
• allocate power;
• determine decision-making processes;
• establish organizational culture; and
• set up procedures for performing specific tasks.

In this resource we use the word trustee interchangeably with board member, and the word trusteeship in relation to governance.

Trusteeship is the holding of a charter of public trust for an institution. Trustees are legally and ultimately responsible for the institution and everything that goes on in it. Trustees are not officers of administration — not in the institution where they are trustees. Trustees are members and representatives of the general public whose trust they hold. (Greenleaf, 1974, p. 94.)

Trustees are what their title implies, persons in whom ultimate trust is placed. Because institutions inevitably harbour conflict, trustees are the court of last resort if an issue arises that cannot be resolved by the active parties. If tangible assets are involved, trustees legally hold them and are responsible to all interested parties for their good use. They have a prime concern for goals and for progress toward goals. They make their influence felt more by knowing and asking questions than by authority, although they usually have authority and can use it if need be.  (p.40.)

For school boards, the resource base includes the board’s taxation power. The external environment includes students, parents, taxpayers and other residents, members of affiliated communities and organizations, as well as the provincial government.

What makes trustees good governors?

The Canadian Comprehensive Audit Foundation (1996) provides characteristics for effective governance. To be good governors, board members and trustees should:

• have or obtain the necessary skill, knowledge, ability and commitment to fulfill their responsibilities;
• understand their purpose and whose interests they represent;
• understand the organization’s objectives and strategies;
• know what information they require and obtain that information;
• act to ensure the organization’s objectives are met and that the organization’s performance is satisfactory; and
• be accountable to those they represent.

What are the implications for board governance of being elected?

Why govern through policies?

The mandate of Saskatchewan school boards is specified in The Education Act, 1995. However, boards have certain discretion over how they will carry out the mandate. What a board delegates to its staff and what it chooses to focus on itself is a key decision.

By focusing on issues in such a way that board decisions are formulated as policies, principles or guidelines for staff to follow and apply, a board is more likely to:

• ensure that its decisions are based on principles, and that these principles are explicit and deliberated;
• that staff will act according to the principles established by the board, but still be able to use their own expertise; and
• have more time to focus on what is important.

The first and most important statement of principle for a board to establish is its mission or vision statement. Elaborating a mission statement helps the board to:

• clarify members’ individual, and the board’s collective, understanding about the organization’s purpose; and
• provide a succinct statement to the outside world about the organization’s purpose.

John Carver is a proponent of policy governance. Carver (1990) advocates leadership through policies, giving four reasons for policy-focused leadership:

• formulating policies and evaluating their implementation provide the board with the most overall control, most efficiently, over the organization;
• the kinds of skills that are required, i.e. policy formulation and evaluation, are accessible to the layperson — specialists are not required on the board;
• focusing on fundamentals means the board deals with what is most important to the organization; and
• policy governance requires and promotes vision and inspiration.

• ends to be achieved;
• means to those ends;
• the board-staff relationship; and
• the process of governance itself.

The theoretical responsibility of the Board of Directors is to set the organization’s policies and plan the association’s strategic direction. Policy is defined as the overall high level of business operation practices and planning of the association within which day-to-day business is conducted. (Belfall, 1995, p. 101.)

...The board should delegate operations to management and not interfere, but also be in control, know what the problems are and make sure that management is doing its job well ... [But] how do directors simultaneously avoid or balance negligence and being too passive on the one hand, and “micro-managing” and being too aggressive on the other? (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 61.)

Houle argues that the conventional categories are sometimes applied too rigidly.

The board’s activities are sometimes called “governance” and the CEO’s, for sake of contrast, “administration” or “management.” But this distinction ultimately proves unsatisfactory, both theoretically and practically. It can imply that the board and the CEO are wholly separate entities—sometimes opponents vying for power—rather than partners in a common enterprise. More than that, the terms used to differentiate the two roles are so hard to define in terms of their relationship to one another that they give little or no help.

Herman describes the Carver model as “heroic,” in other words ideal, but not easily operationalized. The trouble with the policy-administration and Carver models comes in applying the generally accepted principles in specific circumstances. The problems and opportunities that any nonprofit organization faces do not come labeled as major policy or administration.  A board needs to sort out what are their major policies and ends, but it must also be prepared to adjust them as conditions change. This makes the simple divisions between ends and means, or between policy and administration, difficult to implement consistently. (Herman and Heimovics, p.44.)
 

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1995) points out that boards need the capacity to assume a more hands-on role when warranted. Their view is that in normal circumstances, the board should not intrude on the prerogatives and responsibilities of management. Day-to-day management functions should not be performed, even partially, by the board. However, they suggest that the board needs the capacity and the willingness to assume a more active role in managing the organization, at least temporarily, where warranted by exceptional circumstances (i.e., the departure of the CEO with no clearly acceptable successor available, serious financial difficulties that simultaneously create an urgent need for decisions and lessen the credibility of senior management to make them).

Greenleaf points out that the essential issue is power.

Power and its use is one of the central concerns of trustees. The essential definition of the trustee role is that trustees, as a body, hold all of the ultimate (legal) authority. However, they do not use power operationally, that is, they do not administer. They use their legal power to secure information and to monitor and to control the operational use of power. This is the central issue of trusteeship; trustees hold ultimate power but they do not use it operationally. Yet they are responsible for its use. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.102.)

Trustees have a kind of power that administrators and staffs do not have — they have the legal power to manage everything in the institution; they have all the legal power there is. They may delegate some of it, but they can also take it back. They cannot give any of it away, irretrievably and still be trustees. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.102.)

Trustee power, however, is collective power.  The board’s authority is as a group. No individual trustee has direct control over the organization.

Boards committed to governance through policies will have and follow explicit procedures specifying the conditions and circumstances for when and how they take delegated power back. There are, after all, “costs” to taking delegated power back, especially in an ad hoc or unjustified way: the future sense of responsibility of those to whom the board has previously delegated authority will be undermined.
 
Questions for Discussion

What do you perceive as the advantage of governing through policies?

Does your board bring up its mission statement or goals statement often in its deliberations?

How can trustees stay involved? How can they contribute their expertise and experience?

The Saskatchewan school board member/trustee holds office as a member of the public. He or she is not expected to be an expert in education. However, board members are expected to be accountable to those they represent. They must understand the school system’s objectives and strategies. In order to act to ensure the organization’s objectives are met and that the organization’s performance is satisfactory, board members must understand enough about educational strategies to make appropriate choices within their jurisdictions.

Although many educational issues are the jurisdiction of the province, the school board’s purpose is also education, and the school board decisions are key to educational objectives — indeed that is the reason for their existence. In order to be “bridgers” between the school system and the public, and in order to make decisions based on principles, board members need to understand the way their decisions affect learning. This has implications for the kind of information trustees need.

The Education Act, 1995 specifically outlines areas where members of the school board are to be involved, e.g. areas of student supervision and expulsion, teacher dismissal, etc. Even so, the degree of involvement of trustees in school programs and activities is often a question for discussion. A classical policy governance approach would suggest that trustees should have no participation in educational activities. However, in many school divisions trustees are often active participants in school-related activities. In smaller-population communities, individuals are more likely to know each other on a personal basis, and interact in many different capacities in addition to school-related activities. Again, in some views of governance, such close relationships may be perceived as a conflict of interest, especially when trustees are called upon to make decisions affecting their neighbours and acquaintances.

On the other hand, many involved in school governance have pointed out that to deny trustees the opportunity to participate in in-school activities, not only denies the system the use of this resource, but it also reduces for many trustees the enjoyment and learning they obtain from this participation, often one of the incentives for their contribution. Many trustees, for example, contribute through assisting with transportation or providing volunteer services. The resolution would seem to lie in balancing and separating the two roles of trustee as hands-on contributor and trustee as policy-based decision-maker. To be successful, the separation of functions could be structural, with it being clear which committees, task forces, etc. are contributory and which are decision-making. However, board members must also be committed to separating their roles, through understanding why it is better, overall, that they do separate their roles.

Questions for Discussion

Can you think of examples from your own experience when a trustee became too involved in the operations of the school activities? What aspect was difficult and why? Could it have been handled differently?

Can you think of ways in which a board member can influence the educational program and organizational culture without “micro-managing”?

Information is key to effective governance. Knowing what information they require, and in what form, is key to board members’ good decision-making. Making decisions based on principles and policy, choosing among programs and allocating resources to produce the best overall performance and outcomes — these require information of a particular kind. Effective governors ensure they obtain that information. This is not to say that board members will be un-interested in other types of information that pertain to schools and education. However, to fulfill their governance responsibilities, trustees should focus on informing and developing their options.

The CCAF (1996) recommends that good information for governors:

• looks forward: it contributes to future policy or strategic planing decisions;
• explains options: The information identifies and explains the options considered and their consequences and presents the context within which decisions were or should be taken.
• compares intentions with results;
• recognizes appropriate time frames: programs intended to have long-term impacts are not subjected to short-term measures, and vice-versa. The indicators being used are relevant to the issues and activities at hand;
• facilitates comparisons: the information recognizes the unique characteristics of the organization and relevant comparative data;
• promotes understanding without oversimplifying: it balances the need for understanding and simplicity with the complexity of actual programs, services, products, size and organizational arrangements; and
• illuminates policy and administration: it sheds light on the appropriateness of both the established policy and how that policy is administered. It does not seek to draw artificial boundaries around these two distinct though highly interrelated considerations.

Greenleaf’s recommendations about information are consistent with the CCAF. He sees information as the key to restructuring the trustee role. He acknowledges that some of the information that trustees need to know is the same as what inside administrators value. For example, both should have the same basic, summarized financial information and the findings of the independent audit.

However, he points out that most of their information needs are different because their roles are different.

• Recommendations of administrators and staff usually will be a part of the information trustees will want to have.
• But trustees will need information in addition to what administrators and staff give them so that they can make their own independent judgments, contrary to administrative advice if that is their considered judgment
• The trustees may examine their information in meetings of the whole, or in subcommittees.
• Trustees will decide the extent and nature of the information they require in each area where they will make the decision.
• It is important, however, that all information to trustees, whether directly from informed people from inside or outside the institution, or through presentations of studies and reports, be designed for the special needs of trustees; it should not be merely selections or abstracts from information prepared for the use of administrators and staffs. (Greenleaf, 1974, pp.118-119.)

Greenleaf also recommends that the material be presented to trustees with a minimum of written material and a maximum of oral-visual presentation to trustees as a group. This is because trustees are a deliberative body. Information should be designed to give them what they need for their decisions, to conserve their time, and to facilitate a group decision out of discussion.

On the other hand, some print material is also important. Print material provided beforehand gives trustees more time to consider the content. Print material also ensures that “what is read is what is said.”

A key component of board information is evaluative information — information about performance. There are three areas of evaluative information for effective governance:

• organizational performance,
• CEO performance (and possibly that of other management staff), and
• board performance (self-evaluative).

Evaluative information is important to setting future plans and budgetary allocations. Evaluation and monitoring will ensure trustees maintain control over the organization.

In order to make evaluation and monitoring meaningful and helpful, board members must be able to name what they want. That is, they must be able to identify and state what results they want from their organization. This is not an easy or straightforward task — indeed it may be one of the most difficult tasks for a board. The most important results may be intangible or difficult to assess — even to identify. An example is students’ love of learning.

Board members should ensure that evaluative information is meaningful. To be helpful, evaluative information will most likely include both numbers and text— presentation of outcomes linked to explanations of how the outcomes have been achieved or why they have not.

Program descriptions, case histories, analyses, and explanations are important so that decision-makers understand the context and dynamics of how their organization and programs work in practice. Decision-makers cannot make meaningful decisions without fully understanding how organizational strategies actually work to produce outcomes. Numbers are valuable because they provide the magnitude and scope of any particular outcome. Governors must decide for the whole organization — the size of any impact in relation to resources and goals will therefore be an important consideration in setting priorities. However, numbers unlinked from context are meaningless. By the same token, individual stories are not sufficiently informative of the big picture. Both numbers and text have a role in ensuring evaluative information is meaningful.

Who should provide board information?

One of the key issues in the relationship between boards and their staff is that of information flow. Directors need a sound understanding of the organization and its environment, good information about developments that may affect the organization, and sufficient time to consider that information and exercise their judgment as a board. It is usually the responsibility of the Chair of the board to see that these needs are met. The board would expect management to provide comprehensive information in support of proposed strategies presented for adoption, such as the key assumptions made, the support for them, and the significant alternatives that management considered and rejected.

There are some pitfalls, however, noted by analysts.

Some chief executive officers nearly always hold much more organizationally relevant information than the board, as well as greater expertise in a variety of organizationally relevant fields. (Herman and Heimovics, p.51.)

However, some writers point out that boards are increasingly relying on their own sources of performance information, independent of the CEO and management

Under the growing pressure for performance, boards today are increasingly taking control over their own information systems. Recognizing the need for broader, more timely and objective data, boards and board committees are insisting on the right to go beyond the data provided by management to supplement their information, including the use of electronic-based information systems. This makes sense: the kind of information required by a director is often quite different from that normally available to and provided by managers to the board. This can take the form of contracted outside sources and consultants, hired by and reporting directly to such board committees as compensation, environment, and audit. Or, it could be a consulting firm reporting on strategy options to the entire board. (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 287.)

Greenleaf feels that since there is no dependable information source responsible directly to them, most trustee bodies have no adequate way of measuring performance.

Nominal trustees customarily accept, somewhat uncritically, data supplied by internal officers and take no steps to equip themselves to be critical. They restrict themselves to affirming goals that are set by administrators and staff, and with the exception of the certified audit, trustees largely confine themselves to reviewing performance through administrators’ reports on their own work, with little independent data available to them except what they sense intuitively or gather from the “grapevine”....  (Greenleaf, 1974, p.99.)

Some of this may come from inside the institution, from the efforts of internal staff, and some may be from independent research firms or consultants who will be engaged by trustees and report directly to them. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.119.)

Some would argue that the advantage of participatory models is that the involvement of trustees in committee work with staff, administration and clients may provide them with better first-hand information which can lead to collaborative discussion and sound policy.

Questions for Discussion

Do you as a trustee obtain such information on a regular basis?

Does the information you receive allow you to evaluate and/or formulate options?

Do you prefer oral-visual presentations or written material for board deliberations?

Deciding how to decide

Choosing appropriate board processes for decision-making is part of good governance. At times, typical board process may limit board understanding.

How can directors have the kind of discussion and dialogue necessary to understand, and, if necessary, debate issues and agree on decisions when the format of board meetings often prevents this? Management has often already decided the issue, time to consider and discuss is limited, proceedings are formal, the agenda is full, the necessary information and analysis are not available and the culture rules against this approach. (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 61.)

Encouraging and facilitating the transformation from the old culture—egocentricity, formality and ‘don’t-rock-the-boat’—to the new—servant leadership, openness, dialogue and, as necessary, dissent—will become a top priority of all boards [in the future]. (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 285).

• stay in a problem-solving mode;
• identify the basic principles at stake;
• facilitate broad ownership of the problem;
• acquire lead time;
• invest in good, knowledgeable staff; and
• ensure a clear sense of purpose and direction.

For example, humans are more likely to:

• accept a risk option that is framed as gains than one framed as losses; and
• place a high value on a human cost if they know those who will incur it.      (Zey, 1992.)

• Organizational decision-making is a social activity;
• Organizational decision-making is often a negotiation; a question of building an agreement; and
• Most of the effort in organizational decision making is not directed at reaching a decision, but at trying to understand the problem (all together) and to conceive of options for dealing with it

Organizations typically have several purposes. In addition to the explicit goals or objective of a specific decision, constraining every decision are implicit organizational goals:

• the need for legitimacy;
• the need to sustain organizational human resources; and
• the overall societal infrastructure that the organization serves.    (Beach, 1997; March and Shapira, 1992.)

Using ethical frameworks and processes

Public sector boards must be able to justify (not just explain) their decisions to their constituents. Decision makers are asked to deliberate about and justify either their judgments or the principles that underlie them. Justifying decisions includes making explicit the principles that underlie one’s judgments or deliberation. These principles must themselves be defensible in terms of what is right and fair. Ethical frameworks and processes can be very helpful for boards to use both in making decisions and accounting for them to others.

Many decisions are straightforward and can be made quickly, for example,

• the ideas under discussion are clear and relatively similar;
• there is enough information for all to make the decision; or
• there are no significant emotional undertones or difficulties in the discussion.

Sometimes a board needs to seek enthusiastic support, while other times lukewarm or even ambivalent support is sufficient. Consider these features — the higher the level of each, the more the need for support.

• Overall importance of the result;
• Expected longevity of the result;
• Need for stakeholder buy-in;
• Need for implementor buy-in; and
• Difficulty of the issue at hand.    (Kaner 1996.)

Kaner provides a good strategy for making decisions that need the sustained agreement of various stakeholders. He divides the process into three components: (1) intentionally diverging to obtain more ideas and points of view; (2) working through the ideas among the decision-makers to ensure all have achieved at least the same understanding of the issues at hand; and (3) converging to a solution.

Diverging

• survey the territory and identify the components of the issue;
• include all relevant participants;
• search for alternatives and generate different options;
• raise difficult issues.

• build shared understanding and shared context;
• learn each others’ assumptions and values;
• work with ethical processes; and
• build human relationships among the decision-makers.

Converging

• explore inclusive principles to promote joint problem-solving;
• reframe the issue creatively; try to look at it in a new way;
• think in multiple time frames; and
• strengthen good ideas; apply critical reasoning to potential solutions to refine their logic and quality.

How many of your decisions could be considered agreements? Do you have adequate ways to obtain and consider different points of view? Do you have adequate ways to work with different points of view?

Is the CEO the Board’s only employee?

The board is the site where the policies and principles for organizational action are established. This is done through goal and mission statements, policy statements, organizational strategy and allocation of resources. The CEO and other staff implement the organizational action.

Carver is unequivocal about the role of the CEO. His view is that the CEO is the board’s only employee, and all other employees are under his or her jurisdiction. (Carver, 1990.) Other analysts support this view:

The realistic responsibility of the Board of Directors is to ensure that the association has the best CEO possible, that the individual has the requisite authority for the job, and the individual is fully accountable to the Board.  (Belfall, 1995, p. 101.)
...the board’s most important and direct relationship in the firm is with top management, through the CEO. In fact, many authorities contend that the board’s prime function is to hire, monitor, support, evaluate, compensate, counsel and, if necessary, fire the CEO who, in turn, is held responsible for running the company. ... While directors have a direct input to, and feedback from, strategic management, their relationship with most of the activity involved is indirect, through the CEO and his (or her) top officers. (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 54.)

[There is an assumption that] the board-management relationship is a partnership built on mutual trust and effective communication. [However,] the board-management relationship is essentially paradoxical. For many important decisions, the board is the final authority. Yet it must depend on the executive for most of its information and for policy articulation and implementation. The executive has these emergent powers but also is hired and can be fired by the board and needs the board for crucial external functions. (Middleton, 1987, p. 152.)

We discussed above the worry that a rigid separation of policy and operations might lead to an uninformed board. Such worries are also found in relation to the role of the board in relation to its management.

...[Trustees] are legally responsible for supervising …management … but full-time management has the day-to-day presence and thus controls the planning and operations, the information system, and organization. ... [But] how can [trustees] be responsible without really being in control? How should the unavoidable problems arising from the generic tensions and conflicts between the [trustees] and management be handled? (Leighton and Thain, 1997, p. 61.)

A collaborative and dynamic relationship

Some analysts recommend collaborative methods. Collaboration is more than communication and is needed to effectively ensure policy formation and implementation and carried out to everyone’s satisfaction and best interests. Such methods depend on the board and CEO having empathy for each other’s roles.

Indeed, many suggest that the relationship is a partnership, one that depends on mutual trust. It should be harmonious, and it fails if communication about roles and responsibilities is ineffective.

Some writers recommend more fluid relationships between boards, their CEO and other staff.

The ultimate aim would not be a carefully counterpoised balance of board, executive, and staff to provide integrated service and authority but a single homogenized controlling body of people from which all initiative and validation would flow. (Houle, 1989, pp.19-20.)
As with all paradoxes, resolution is not possible.  Instead the relationship is dynamic, and its movement depends on a number if individual, group and organizational factors. (Middleton, 1997, p. 152.)

Ultimately it is the board’s responsibility to establish the culture and ethics that ensure the relationships are conducive to effective communication and decision-making.

Greenleaf’s views are unequivocal about the problems with the current perspective, in relation to both the CEO and the management. He presents alternatives to the conventional views:

The model of the single chief sitting atop the hierarchy is obsolete, and consequently we are at a point of crisis for want of trust in our major institutions. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.70.)

1. Most of the efforts to meet the rising social expectations are largely coercive, either through government edict, the fostering of countervailing forces, or pressure tactics.
2. We are wedded to the belief in one-man leadership.
3. Administrators and staff assume the total burden and trustees are kept in a subservient role, partly because it is the custom (and only a rare hard-nosed and determined trustee will challenge the custom.) (Greenleaf, 1974, p.111.)

An important aspect of power is the fact of countervailing power which most constituencies of all institutions have to some degree... While it may be a source of distress to trustees and administrators, and it may be a substantial impediment to improving performance, trustees should recognize that this kind of countervailing power is a necessary condition of all human arrangements. No one should be powerless! And it can be taken as axiomatic that if trustee power is not used well, staff power, administrative power, and employee power are also not likely to be used well. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.85.)

In summary, the prevailing view is that the board and staff have separate roles, the CEO functions as the head of the operational arm as well as the main support to the board, and therefore acts as the gateway between board and the rest of the organization.

There are slightly differing views, however, about the relationships between the board and other staff. Some, such as Carver, see the CEO as the only employee, while others recommend a more team like approach with managers. No analysts recommend that board’s directly hire or supervise any other staff but the CEO. However, many recommend a more porous relationship to increase communication and understanding between board and management.

Questions for Discussion

What principles or beliefs would guide your board and management in their relationship?

To be accountable means to justify decisions and actions. School boards are formally accountable to both the province and to the electorate. In a more informal sense, board members also have a measure of accountability to their pupils, the parents, the public, their staff and to one another.

The school board, similar to a municipal council and unlike for-profit boards or non-governmental organizations, is elected by the public, and is intended to represent the interests of the public. Present are assumptions and expectations associated with democratic structures. Such assumptions include adequate representation, open debate, and advocacy around issues of concern to the public.

Middleton discusses the link between the board and its external environment.

Boards of directors are part of the organization because they are responsible in the broadest sense for its well-being and for ensuring that it fulfills its stated purpose. They are part of the external environment in the sense that their members are drawn from and often have primary affiliations to other groups in the community. Thus, boards, as boundary-spanning and control units, have an important role in regulating exchanges of information and resources across boundaries.  (Middleton, 1987, p. 141.)

Inclusion of these constituents as board members is one strategy.

Co-optation, as defined by Selznick (1949) in his classic study of the relationship between board behavior and external demands, is a process whereby crucial outside parties are absorbed into the leadership or policy-making structure in order to avoid threats to the organization’s stability. Selznick and others have noted that co-optation is a two-way street. The organization takes the risk that external co-opted members will influence the organization for their own purposes, which may differ from those of the organization. In some cases, these purposes represent a link between community power and involvement on local nonprofit boards of directors. (Middleton, 1987, p.145.)

So far as possible, battles should be prevented, not sought. But it is undeniably true that some boards have been set up to protect a certain function of government from partisan politics, and this fact in itself may build a certain amount of tension into the situation. If possible, the board should work closely with the political officials (who, it should be remembered, are also representative public servants ) while still retaining its own essential identity. It is necessary to walk the line (often a narrow one) between getting too far away from politics and thereby removing the board from public responsiveness and getting so closely involved in partisanship that the board loses its independence. (Houle, 1989, pp.171-172.)

Mathiason comments on the effect of an advocacy orientation:

.. advocacy and public interest organizations, “which are constantly at the barricades seeking changes in society, that may not be able to develop the third-stage, institutional and fund-raising boards just described. It may be that the controversial and combative nature of their work may not be sufficiently attractive to large givers and people of prestige who will be willing to raise funds and support the organization’s cause. On the other hand, many cause-oriented organizations have, despite their controversial nature, become well-recognized institutions in our society, and have proved capable of attracting board members and donors from one part or another of the political spectrum.” (Mathiason, 1990, p.16.)

Enhancing democratic participation is a board responsibility

Froese (1998) suggests that there are two agendas for school boards:

• healthy relations with their publics; and
• advocacy for the concept of school boards.

From this perspective, it follows that school boards have a responsibility to extend their specific role in education to that of increasing the extent and quality of public debate. Enhancing democratic citizenship is important.

David Held (1996) states that the principle of justification for a participatory democracy is that:

An equal right to liberty and self-development can only be achieved in a participatory society, a society which fosters a sense of political efficacy, nurtures a concern for collective problems and contributes to the formation of a knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a sustained interest in the governing process.

Questions for Discussion

Have you experienced your board being faced with an issue of competing accountability between the provincial government and the public? How did you resolve it?

Have you experienced your board being faced with competing demands from different components of its constituency? How did you resolve it?

Being effective governors requires board members and trustees to have the necessary skill, knowledge, ability and commitment to fulfill their responsibilities. This includes knowledge about the organization and its program, as well as the processes and information required for effective governance. Boards require training in group relationships and decision-making. Decision makers need to know about making decisions — both influences and process.

Board education should focus on decision-making and governance process, including the issues we have discussed in this handbook:

• what the role of the board is;
• what makes a good mission or vision statement;
• integrating principles and values explicitly into decision-making;
• formulating principle or policy based decisions;
• how to “name” what we really want;
• critiquing information and making the best use of evaluative information;
• generating options;
• appropriate consultative and representative processes that also maintain accountability; and
• ways to enhance democratic citizenship.

Precisely what trustees need to know and how they will organize to learn what they need to know, will be worked out in each situation and will be unique to it. And part of the trustees’ commitment to leading the institution will be their unrelenting effort to learn what they need to know in order to oblige the institution to reach distinction as a servant. (Greenleaf, 1974, p.87.)

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Note: For the sake of consistency, in citations from Houle, Powell and Belfall, the terms Executive Director and Chief of Staff were changed to Chief Executive Officer.